


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3 August 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


6. Notes: South Vietnam; [redacted] Afghanistan -
[redacted] Communist China. (Page 7)

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SAN JULIAN SAM SITE AND AIRFIELD FACILITIES



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DAILY BRIEF

Cuba-USSR: (The number of Cuban personnel currently undergoing surface-to-air missile (SAM) training may be sufficient for the operation of all 24 SAM sites in Cuba.)

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(On this basis, all the firing and fire-control batteries in the 24-site SAM system in Cuba could be operated by 1,500 Cuban technicians. A ten-month SAM training course for Cuban personnel--the first phase of which is probably being conducted at the San Julian airfield in Pinar del Rio Province [redacted])

[redacted] The San Julian SAM site and airfield has sufficient billeting and classroom facilities for 2,500 personnel, including students, instructors, and security and support personnel.)

(In addition to the 1,500 technicians, some 500 Cuban SAM communications and acquisition radar operators will also be required. Many of these)

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Cubans have probably already been trained. In addition, 1,500 security and support personnel are necessary but could be provided by readily available non-technical Cuban Army personnel.)

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Finally, at the six SAM support/headquarters areas, about 500 missile, electronics and other specialists will probably be needed for maintenance and repair, but these billets may be filled by Soviet SAM technicians remaining in Cuba after the system has been transferred to Cuban control.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: (Neutralist military leaders appear increasingly disenchanted over their association with General Phoumi and are pressing to achieve a more independent position.)

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(General Amkha Soukhavong, newly appointed director of Souvanna's neutralist staff in Vientiane, recently said that "the only possible way for Laos to endure" is for the US to furnish aid directly to the neutralists rather than through supply channels controlled by Phoumi. He claims that at present Phoumi exercises an inordinate degree of control over the neutralists' military posture.)

(Kong Le last week also expressed concern lest the neutralists be "absorbed" by Phoumi. He, too, called for the establishment of separate supply channels in order to allow the neutralists to remain independent of the right-wing forces.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Brazil: President Goulart, during a visit to the impoverished northeast early this week, warned of revolution if his basic reform program is not enacted soon.

In Recife, capital of Pernambuco, Goulart told a large crowd which had been turned out by the pro-Communist governor that "God alone knows my fight that these reforms be made peacefully. . . before they are made by rebellion of the people." He stated that his proposals called for land reforms which would raise the number of proprietors from three to ten or twelve million, and for adjustments in the system of taxation so that taxes do not fall "solely on the people." He wound up by warning those who opposed him that they did not know the "risks they were running."

Goulart's other speeches in Recife were more moderate in tone, thus leaving in doubt how he will go about gaining his ends. In these he appeared to be trying to cast an image of himself as a devotee of democracy, while at the same time using the threat of violence to intimidate the congress.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

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South Vietnam: (Conservative Buddhist leaders are reported to be under increasing pressure from extremist clergy to shift the emphasis of the protest movement from religious to political grounds. One of the extremists' tactics is to bring to Saigon Buddhist clergy from central Vietnam and from the Cambodian border area. Many of these clergy favor a neutral South Vietnam. The conservatives believe the US should intervene secretly to bring about a quick settlement so as to prevent new violence and keep the conservatives in control.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Afganistan - Communist China: An agreement on demarcation of the Sino-Afghan border was initialed in Kabul on 1 August. Afghan officials have agreed to hold a formal signing ceremony in Peiping next month. Kabul is pleased with the agreement but has resisted Chinese suggestions that the pact include a nonaggression clause and be proclaimed with greater fanfare. Peiping has been eager to conclude another frontier accord in its continuing effort to show up India's alleged intransigence in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

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DAILY BRIEF

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DAILY BRIEF

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